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Abstract Synthetic biology aims at reconstructing life to
put to the test the limits of our understanding. It is based on
premises similar to those which permitted invention of
computers, where a machine, which reproduces over time,
runs a program, which replicates. The underlying heuristics
explored here is that an authentic category of reality,
information, must be coupled with the standard categories,
matter, energy, space and time to account for what life is.
The use of this still elusive category permits us to interact
with reality via construction of self-consistent models
producing predictions which can be instantiated into
experiments. While the present theory of information has
much to say about the program, with the creative properties
of recursivity at its heart, we almost entirely lack a theory
of the information supporting the machine. We suggest that
the program of life codes for processes meant to trap
information which comes from the context provided by the
environment of the machine.
Keywords Algorithmic complexity · Logical depth ·
Physical entropy · Self-organisation · Field · Context
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Reconstructing life is central to synthetic biology’s efforts,
as a means to try and understand what life is. I explore the
consequences of the model of the cell-as-a-computer,
where the “chassis” is explicitly separated from the pro-
gram, as in a computer (Danchin 2009a). As a heuristics,
information is viewed here as an authentic category of
reality. I organise in what follows a tentative philosophical
reﬂection on constraints met by synthetic biology around
four themes which I see as a true revolution of human
thinking, the shift from a mechanistic view of the world to
an algorithmic view, with the result that living organisms
can be understood as information traps.
The modern reﬂection on information began with
Hilbert’s problems at the beginning of the XXth century.
One of his questions was whether arithmetics, the mathe-
matics of whole numbers, was simply a tautology, i.e. its
conclusions could be automatically drawn and reached
from its premises. The response brought about by Go ¨del
and successors after 1931 recognised that arithmetic was
incomplete, in that it could bring about conclusions which
were understandable only when taking a point of view from
the outside of arithmetics. Arithmetics incompleteness
establishes that whole numbers theory must be separated
from its meaning for the human creator and observer.
Brieﬂy, arithmetics is associated to two levels of infor-
mation: the self-sufﬁcient information carried by strings of
symbols, and the information carried by the context: lan-
guage and civilisation, or more generally, by the biological
entities we name Homo sapiens. The latter provides
interpretations of the demonstrations and theorems created
by the axioms and deﬁnitions of number theory but the
corresponding information has not yet been theorised.
Based as is arithmetics on strings of symbols, the
alphabetic metaphor of the genetic program sits at the
centre of several theses which I try to make explicit, via a
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egory information within synthetic biology: 1. A thousand-
year-old metaphysical/ontological thesis, where I discuss
the relationships between shape, form and the process of
in-formation; 2. An epistemological thesis exploring how
information links models of phenomena to reality in a
situation identifying two levels of information, the infor-
mation of the model, and the meaning of the model; 3. The
exploration of extant theories of information as a pre-
requisite to understand the concept of genetic program in
synthetic biology; 4. A conjecture proposing the need to
create a new theory, that of information of the chassis
(machine) or, why the brain is not a computer.
Metaphysical thesis: shape, form and information
When searching for life outside Earth we look for “unu-
sual” shapes, not commonly associated with standard
chemistry and mineralogy. We restrict our identiﬁcation of
forms, looking ﬁrst for the 3D architecture of the “chassis”
which compartmentalises the living entity (see for example
the beginning of Monod’s Chance and Necessity (Monod
1971)). Typically we draw aside crystalline shapes, and
look for more complex shapes such as those of spheroidal
or tubular objects. Yet, we need more to recognise life, as
drawing our conclusions from the geometry of shapes can
be misleading (this happens when an artefact is interpreted
as a biological entity’s signature (Clemmer and Beebe
1991)). Furthermore, the form of living organisms does not
reduce to their static shapes, it implies dynamic processes.
From the early times of philosophy, life was identiﬁed
as a phenomenon connected to recognisable autonomous
but not independent categories. To account for all phe-
nomena, Aristotle recognised ten categories: οὐσία,
προσότης, ποιότης, πρός τι, κεı ˜σθαι, ἔξις, τόπος, χρόνος,
πράττειν, παθεı ˜ν. An essential step in understanding reality
required construction of some entanglement of these cate-
gories, a process which progressively reduced them to four:
matter, space, time, and subsequently energy. A remark-
able achievement was reached when Einstein combined
them together in a surprisingly concise equation, E = mc
2.
Yet, it was obvious that these universal categories do not
account for many phenomena: no one has been able, for
example, to derive the crystal lattice of a mineral as simple
as sodium chloride from the equations of microscopic
physics (Grandy 1992). Imagine the challenge for synthetic
biology!
Even understanding what became the modern category
matter was never simple: matter displayed itself as an
immense variety of entities (shapes, processes, phase
transitions and even transmutations…). One could think
about substance (οὐσία, ὕλη and the like, with all kinds of
idiosynchrasies) but something more was required. Ana-
lysing movement of matter, the Atomists invented a
process permitting matter to take form, to be in-formed, via
the interaction of indivisible Parmenidian tiny material
particles, the atoms. This process had the excellent prop-
erty to account for an inﬁnity of forms, but it asked for a
process causing interaction. The core of the Atomists’
thought was that necessity (ἀνάνγκη), associated to some
consistency, λόγος, not chance (which is neither a Greek
nor a scientiﬁc concept (Grandy 1992)), was the ultimate
cause (Danchin 1986). In short, the problem of creation of
form, in-formation, superimposed on the general problem
of movement. In addition to phenomenology, understand-
ing in-formation required a process of synthesis. In this
context, synthesis became a direct exploration of the con-
cept of creation, uncovering a link between in-formation
and creation. This was understood soon after chemistry was
born—chemical synthesis is at the heart of modern chem-
istry—and it is therefore not unexpected that biology,
where form is apparent everywhere, should develop into
synthetic biology.
Already asked by the presocratic philosophers the
question of the nature and origin of form was renewed by
Aristotle. After him, the question kept developing with
Greeks in Alexandria and southern Italy, Arab and scho-
lastic philosophy from the fall of the roman empire till the
fourtheenth century. Between Aristotle and the present
time, I retain John Scotus Eriugena because of the way he
tackled the problem of creation (Erige `ne trans. 1995). A
neo-platonist, Eriugena divided Nature into four species:
(1) Nature which creates and is not created; (2) Nature
which creates and is created; (3) Nature which does not
create and is created; (4) Nature which neither creates nor is
created. To make a long argument short, asking questions
thiswayleadstoﬁvemodesofopposition,whichintroducea
hierarchy in natural entities, and in particular in living
beings. As in the platonistic tradition, the material world of
our experience is composed of ideas clothed in matter.
However, Eriugena attempted to reconcile Plato with Aris-
totle, discussing Aristotle’s ten categories. Time and space
were discussed as central for human perception of phe-
nomena, matter is without form or limit, but it needs an
external agent to take form, it needs to be in-formed. Inter-
estingly,God,asdeﬁnedbyscriptures,escapesallcategories
except one, relatio (πρός τι, ad aliquid), which I retain here
asitliesbehindwhatwenownameinformation.Thiselusive
category remains central today (relationships appears typi-
cally in the god-like self-organisation (Grandy 1992)).
The second name I keep in this sequence is Averroe ¨s.
His commentaries of the metaphysics of Aristotle had
immediate and lasting success. I retain sentences of his
Tahafut al Tahafut: «Matter only becomes in so far as it is
combined with form. Everything that comes into being
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give rise to an inﬁnite regress and lead directly to inﬁnite
matter which is impossible, even if we assume an eternal
mover, for there is no actual inﬁnite; or the forms must be
interchangeable in the ingenerable and incorruptible sub-
stratum, eternally and in rotation.» (Averroe ¨s trans. 1497).
That substratum, substance, was difﬁcult to make explicit.
First split into the four elements, ﬁre, air, water and earth,
and, subsequently seen as atoms (which, despite their
name, recently split into further particles), it needed asso-
ciation with something which makes the root of variety in
the world, form (ε δος).
How could form combine with matter? A variety of
animas (souls and spirits) were invented to account for the
birth, development and conservation of movement, until
energy came in. This category permitted some entangle-
ment of matter with space and time, and long took the role
of the animating principle needed to account for life (see
mesmerism and its “animal magnetism” and “positive
energy” in small talk or the vocabulary of sects today).
Many further categories required to account for life were
discussed for centuries in the western world, most often
based on the assumption that reality had to ﬁt with explicit
revelation by God of its characters, as written in the
Scriptures. Thomas Aquinas used Averroe ¨s’ Grand Com-
mentary of Aristotle’s Metaphysics as his model. In his
Summa theologica he analysed the questions of Trinity and
of creation, showing that standard reasoning tells us that
creation is related with in-formation, placing relationships
between all kinds of entities (including abstract entities) at
a central position.
These analyses may be condensed in the question asked
by the Pythia in Delphi: “I have a boat made of planks of
wood. The planks are progressively replaced as they rot
away. After some time, all have been replaced, none of the
original ones remain: is it the same boat?” (Danchin 2003).
To understand what life is, we need to understand the
relationships between entities recognised as belonging to
life, whether they are material, processes, or abstract, such
as language. And we need to try and understand the process
of in-formation (which we would in the modern terms
name creation of information, noting that in the evolution
of languages redundancy is a ubiquitous trend (Livingstone
2003)).
Information links models with reality
Belonging to reality we cannot behave as outsiders con-
templating the world. Understanding information asks us to
investigate the way science is constructed. Presocratic
Greek philosophers recognised that our limitations in
understanding truth (ἀλήθεια) only allowed us to give our
views (δόξα) on reality. “And for a certain truth, no man
has seen it nor will there ever be a man who knows about
the gods and about all the things I mention. For if he
succeeds in the end in saying what is completely true, he
himself is nevertheless unaware of it; and opinion is ﬁxed
by fate upon all things” said Xenophanes (Diels and Kranz
1935). Approaching truth is to place a fragment of reality
in a particular perspective, where we can understand its
relationships with human beings. The central tenet of sci-
ence—often ignored, as many scientists behave as priests
of a revealed religion when interacting with mass media—
is that we construct models distinct from reality. We match
models with phenomena, expressing local instances of
reality in a particular context. Models may display a certain
degree of adequacy, if not truth, with reality. The model/
reality separation is so signiﬁcant that several concomitant
models may express our knowledge about a particular side
of reality.
The importance of models to understand reality trig-
gered the creation of axiomatics, mathematics and logics.
This effort was well ﬁtted to the Renaissance trend to
replace Aristotle by Plato, removing the thought of the
former to the “dark centuries” of Middle Ages. At the heart
of platonistic philosophy, the shadows of mathematical
archetypes had to be discovered by persons who were
illuminated by their truth. This attitude placed mathematics
in the world of idealities, suggesting that mathematical
certainties existed separately. The medieval reﬂection on
in-formation was soon replaced by a geometrical view of
combinatorial creation of forms associated to the general
structure of space, initially studied in one, two or three
dimensions and later generalised to all kinds of dimensions.
In parallel, and following a medieval trend of arabic
mathematics, arithmetics and number theory slowly
emerged as algebraic equations. Models recognised as of
the highest quality were mathematical models, developing
on their own, independently of reality with their in-built
consistency (information). Trying to match models with
reality allowed scientists to progress by producing better
and better adequation with reality (Danchin 1992; Putnam
1988). However, the match between models and reality
could never be direct (a mathematical model of an aero-
plane does not ﬂy). It rested on interpretations (processes
rooted in culture and language, thus associated to a prop-
erty that we might name context and linked to a research
programme (Lakatos 1976, 1980)).
If constructing models while confronting them to reality
deﬁnes science (Popper 1959), then the effort to establish
an explicit demarcation between science and non-science is
dominated by a particular category of reality, information
again, using the word with all its fuzzy connotations
(Popper 1963). Deﬁning what science is emphasises two
types of information, information of the (mathematical)
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old category, relatio, at their heart, but only the former has
yet been theorised, in the chaining of axioms and deﬁni-
tions, demonstrations and theorems (Danchin 2003).
The way synthetic biology is developing illuminates
these points. Starting from preconceived biological views,
it abstracts speciﬁc features into axioms and deﬁnitions,
and builds up models, whether mathematical or experi-
mental (e.g. engineering models) (Endy 2005). The models
unfold with their own rules of consistency: a demonstration
in mathematics, yielding a theorem, a computer output in a
simulation, a genetically modiﬁed cell in an experiment…
Subsequently one goes back to reality by proposing a
concrete instantiation of the output, predicting a particular
phenomenon. This prediction is of two major types: Either
the prediction of a novel, previously unknown or unrec-
ognised entity (a structure, a process, a metabolite…), or
that of a particular behaviour of reality, which should
manifest itself along lines predicted by the model (Fig. 1).
A model is (temporarily!) valid when all its predictions are
recognised in actualisations of reality. Typically, in syn-
thetic biology bacteria have been constructed which
display, as expected, some type of multistable behaviour or
oscillations (Elowitz and Leibler 2000) or phages with
artiﬁcial regulatory regions have been shown to display the
ability to grow on cells (Chan et al. 2005). In neurosciences
the basis of neuromimetic networks rests on a vast number
of works where selective processes play a central role
(Changeux et al. 1973; Edelman 1987).
However, because the model is not reality, this ideal
outcome never develops for a long time. Even when we
produce a new entity not recognised before the model’s
construction—a great success, comes a time when a phe-
nomenon does not ﬁt the model’s predictions. To proceed
with our example: in bacteria, bistability is not stable in
time (Veening et al. 2008). Initial attempts to solve the
contradictions between model predictions and observed
phenomena do not immediately discard the model. The
common practice we witness in synthetic biology is re-
interpretation of the instantiation process that matched the
model to reality. Typically: “exceptions make the rule”, or
“this is not exactly what we meant, we need to focus more
on this or that feature”…This polishing step permits the
context of the model and its associated phenomena to be
deﬁned as accurately as possible. It marks the moment
when technically arid efforts such as normalisation,
deﬁning a proper nomenclature, a database data schema
have a central role. We witness this today in synthetic
biology in the standardisation effort of the community
(Endy 2005). Despite all efforts to reconcile predictions
and phenomena, the inadequacy between the model and
reality becomes insoluble. This contradiction implies that
we need to reconsider the axioms and deﬁnitions upon
which the model has been constructed, triggering a spiral
of further models, making science as we know it. As
always with exploration, this exploratory attitude meets
resistance: most of our contemporaries would be happy to
be believers, and forget about the impossible but necessary
quest of truth (Danchin 1992). This may explain both the
hype and the reluctance to accept synthetic biology.
In the subsequent inﬂation of models there is a hierar-
chy. A mathematical demonstration is perceived as the
ultimate proof (Popper 1963). This justiﬁes the huge
number of mathematical models published in systems and
synthetic biology. Do they result in non-trivial predictions?
I am afraid that, more often than not, most models are
“retrodictions”, ﬁnding what is already well known (how
often do metabolic models “discover” the Krebs cycle?),
rather than predictions. Indeed, assessing the interpretation
of postulates which have not been expressed in a precise
way has deep consequences, including in mathematics,
which illustrates the importance of the category informa-
tion, connecting it with the standard categories of reality
(time in particular). Deep features of axiomatics were
understood when we discovered that something taken for
granted was overlooked. Zermelo’s axiom of choice (given
any two sets, one set is in one-to-one correspondence with
some subset of the other: this looks trivial, but is not) is a
famous example of this situation. Similarly, and in line
with the Pythagorean/Platonistic tradition, we accept syn-
chrony in the way we use mathematics, making it
independent of time: when reasoning by recurrence, if we
show that something is true for n+1, knowing it is true for
n, this will be valid, whatever the size of n. We take for
granted very large numbers eventhough it will be
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Fig. 1 Schematic representation of the dialogue between models and
reality. Note that the context is essential in isolating postulates. Also,
many models can co-exist, and, beside mathematical models
approaches using analogies and simulations can behave as models.
Contrary to Karl Popper’s wish there is no clearcut link between
models and reality, precluding universal processes to deﬁne the exact
contours of Science
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implies that there is no time involved (no computation) to
access them, assuming that the nature of mathematics does
not change if n is very large. What would happen if we
modiﬁed this axiom? Non-standard analysis explores our
limitations if we accept that the behaviour of mathematics
changes for inﬁnitely small or inﬁnitely large numbers (an
effort that permitted Leibniz to invent differential equa-
tions) (Robinson 1996). This is mentioned here as another
example of the fact, well established by Ruelle (2000), that
mathematics do not exist outside reality (Desanti 1968), but
belongs to it.
The present status of information in synthetic biology
Most developments of synthetic biology consider the
genetic program as an algorithm, implicitly assuming that
the cell behaves as a computer, a machine manipulating
information. I will not repeat the argument meant to justify
the model of the cell as a Turing Machine (Danchin
2009a). Sufﬁces it to say that this implies the existence of
two entities, associated via a read/write process. A machine
is moving a device that carries a support with a linear
string of symbols written in a ﬁnite alphabet; the data of the
string of symbols, read by the machine, triggers its future
actions. The focal point of representing the atom of life, the
cell, as a Turing Machine, assumes the physical separation
between machine (“chassis”) and data/program, repre-
sented by one or several linear strings of symbols. The crux
of the model is that one should be able to isolate the entity
carrying the program, put it back in a recipient host, and
observe that the program in its new location displays
phenomena speciﬁc of the information it carries. Beside
experiments showing that pieces of program can be han-
dled by cells (viruses and horizontal gene transfer),
experiments produce results consistent with the model: 1.
Animal cloning (Wilmut et al. 1997) is now commonplace;
2. The genome of a Mycoplasma species M. mycoides, was
transplanted into another species, M. capricolum, and after
several rounds of reproduction (reproduction of the
machine and replication of the program, see below) the
host species was replaced by a colony of the donor genome
(Lartigue et al. 2007). This latter experiment is so impor-
tant conceptually that it is essential for synthetic biology
that it is reproduced in many laboratories. Yet, this might
not satisfy us that the model is adequate to represent
reality. Three main lines of reasoning argue against the
cell-as-a-computer model.
1. The ﬁrst counterargument explores the concept of
Operating System (OS) (von Neumann 1958). Because
the machine is separated from the program, a subset of
the program must be devoted to the interaction with
the machine and its “users” (in the most general sense)
(Danchin 2009a). If a particular routine is meant to
reproduce the machine, then a subset of the program
must be somehow linked to the architecture of the
machine. Analysis of the genes giving bacteria their
shape showed that there is indeed an unexpected
coincidence between gene clustering in genomes and
shape of bacteria (Tamames et al. 2001). In multicel-
lular organisms, the distribution of control genes, the
homeogenes, parallels the body plan: changing the
order of some homeogenes in the chromosomes
changed the shape of the organism, putting organs in
the place of others (Gaunt 1991). Rather than an
objection, the existence of a correlation between the
organisation of the program and the architecture of the
organism ﬁts a prediction of the model.
2. The second counterargument is that the program is
carried by some material structure, bringing about
contextual information. However, this is true in
computers as well: the material support of the program
has its saying in permitting the machine to run
properly. Different machines may be driven by the
same program on different supports. Thus, even the
cloning experiment, which does not involve naked
DNA but a whole nucleus, with its envelope, its
proteins and its RNAs, is not different from a material
support of a program in a computer. Indeed, nocturnal
animals use chromatin in the nuclei of neurons using
the retina in an extraordinary way. Their retina can
detect one unique photon. Yet, the photon receptors are
located behind neurons, which absorb or diffuse
photons rather than preciously conserve them. When
light is dimmed, the chromatin changes transcription
and reorganises in such a way that its material behaves
as a lens, focusing photons on receptors located behind
the neurons (Solovei et al. 2009)! This novel function
for DNA, which has nothing to do with its role in
carrying the genetic program, shows that another type
of information has to be taken into account. In the
same way, in many computers the support of the OS
belongs the casing part of the chassis.
3. A third counterargument is that many rules prescribe
the organisation of the cell soma, reﬂecting a large
amount of information unrelated to the information in
the program. Quite true, but this is true again for
computers as well. The design of the interfaces, the
microprocessors and the energy supply of the machine
require much information.
In summary, two types of information (coupling of a
particular form—not simply shape—with matter, energy,
space and time), information of the chassis (casing +
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together in a cell (Tanaka 1984). A synthetic cell needs the
association of a chassis developing metabolism (not a
simple 3D casing) and a program similar to that found in
computers. The conclusions of Dyson’s argument on the
double origin of life, with reproducing metabolism pre-
dating replication are therefore a pre-requisite for synthesis
of life (Dyson 1985). This dichotomy is visible in present
synthetic biology, with a fairly clear separation between
those who study the chassis (and are often also interested in
the origin of life) (Kuruma et al. 2009; Shenhav and Lancet
2004) and those who think that life is essentially due to the
genetic program, organising their activity around con-
struction of program biobricks, or even as complete
genomes (Gibson et al. 2008).
Information of the program
The study of the genetic program as a text, applying
accepted rules of the theory of information (Shannon and
Weaver 1949; Cover and Thomas 1991) to its analysis
(He ´nautetal.1996)resulted intheemphasisplacedonDNA
in synthetic biology. Schneider created his famous “logo”
representation of sequences (Schneider and Stephens 1990)
in a model of molecular machines based on Shannon’s
information (Schneider 1991a, b). His work was based on
the intuition that creation of information was consuming
energy (Schneider 1991b). Furthermore, it assumed that the
data has no meaning (hence no “value”), and could be
characterised purely by analysing the probability of pres-
ence of a given symbol in the sequence, generating its logo
(Schneider and Stephens 1990). A similar trend is visible in
the way information is used in the mass media. It is current
writing—because all kinds of signals can be digitised—that
everything has an information coded in sequences of (0,1),
restricting the concept of information to that particular view
of sequences of symbols, and forgetting about in-formation
(creation and accumulation of information, or a value
associated to an information). The common feature of this
conceptualisation is dematerialisation: the corresponding
information becomes an abstract entity, which can be
manipulated using mathematic tools.
Yet pure abstraction is obviously inaccurate in terms of
what we would like to name information. Messages without
meaning (random messages) are without value. “O singe
fort” in German has a meaning totally different from that in
French (Yockey 1992). Can we see, even within the digi-
tisation (or binarisation) paradigm, whether we should
go further? The soviet school of electronics following
Andronov, Kolmogorov, and the Americans Chaitin and
Solomonoff constructed formal models of information vs
chance by considering sequences of symbols as the result of
an algorithm. Any sequence of symbols has some algo-
rithmic complexity: the length of the shortest program
generating the sequence. A repeated sequence of 2n bits
0101010…is coded by a simple program of the type:
BEGIN DO [1,n] PRINT 01 RETURN END. For n large,
the program is much shorter than the sequence. In contrast,
if the sequence is random (this is proposed as a deﬁnition of
randomness), the only way to get the sequence is BEGIN
PRINT \sequence[ END, i.e. a program with a length
similar to that of the sequence.
Algorithmic complexity has been related to Shannon’s
information (Cover and Thomas 1991) and to physical
entropy: “Algorithmic randomness provides a rigorous,
entropy-like measure of disorder of an individual, micro-
scopic, deﬁnite state of a physical system. It is deﬁned by
the size (in binary digits) of the shortest message specify-
ing the microstate uniquely up to the assumed resolution.
Equivalently, algorithmic randomness can be expressed as
the number of bits in the smallest program for a universal
computer that can reproduce the state in question (for
instance, by plotting it with the assumed accuracy). In
contrast to the traditional deﬁnitions of entropy, algorith-
mic randomness can be used to measure disorder without
any recourse to probabilities” (Zurek 1989). This success
led many to think that we had a ﬁnal Theory of Informa-
tion, which could tell us what information is.
However, we can point out a ﬁrst difﬁculty here. We
know of an inﬁnite set of transcendent numbers, such a π,
whose digits are generated by fairly short algorithms while
their succession cannot be predicted. They are therefore of
limited algorithmic complexity. Yet, they are much more
interesting than repeated sequences with the same com-
plexity. Knowing the exact value of a digit placed in the
digits of π, very far away in the digitisation might be inter-
esting, but the only way to reachthat value is toactualise the
process of computation. Bennett named logical depth the
time needed to reach that value and related it to physical
complexity(Bennett1988b).Thisisaﬁrstindicationthatwe
are far from having a thorough theory of information.
How do we have access to the information of the genetic
program? Practice of computation is fairly old (well before
al’Khawarizmi algorithms, Erastothenes’ sieve is a familiar
example) but we had to wait for Pascal’s computing
machine, and for Lovelace and Babbage Analytical Engine
to reach today’s situation, with the basic concepts proposed
by Turing, von Neumann and others, coupling the machine
and the program, via an OS managing the “housekeeping”
functions of the machine. The functions coded by the
genetic program are the result of a very long evolution.
And if we keep the algorithmic metaphor, because DNA
comes from DNA comes from DNA… in an endless rep-
lication process, the nucleotides in the sequence have
considerable logical depth.
130 A. Danchin
123As with computer OSs, the housekeeping program is
abstract and general, yet its concrete implementation,
resulting from billions of years of evolution, makes that
several OSs may coexist, revealing again two kinds of
information, information of the program and information of
the context in which the program is expressed. This has
considerable consequences for synthetic biology: cellular
functions can be general and ubiquitous, whereas there is
no reason why they should always be performed by
structurally related objects. Overall, living cells display
similar abstract features, and the genetic code argues for
universality. Yet, Woese uncovered a signiﬁcant discrep-
ancy between two unicellular classes, the Archaea and the
Bacteria (Woese et al. 1978). To identify ubiquitous
functions operated by non-ubiquitous structures one had to
devise an operational strategy, based on the concept of
gene persistence (tendency of a given gene to be present in
a quorum of species) (Fang et al. 2005). Different structural
entities with common functions in different bacterial clades
were indeed characterised (Danchin 2009b; Woese 2002).
A structure is therefore recruited for a particular function,
dependent on the context in which it operates. The context
creates the function.
A way forward: the information of the machine/chassis
Emphasis on the idea of information as meaningless strings
of symbols (Shannon and Weaver 1949), restricted our
thought to that very limited feature of reality. In the Turing
Machine, there is a machine. While its actions are explicit,
nothing is said about its innards, at least when mathema-
ticians analyse its behaviour. This is no longer so when
engineers build up computers. The same is true for the
chassis in synthetic biology. Not only does one need to
make a machine that performs the actions of the cell/Tur-
ing Machine but this machine needs to be implemented in
the real world (Tanaka 1984). It must be made of explicit
matter, its actions need to be energised and there must be
an Environment/Machine interaction with sensors, trans-
porters, adhesins, safety valves (Danchin 2009c)…
The information of the chassis provides the relevant
context which allows it to read the program and interpret it
into actions (including modifying the program). Even sys-
tems which “self-organise” do not organise by themselves,
but do so only when placed in proper context, which drives
organisation (the DNA double helix does not form in
dimethylformamide) (Grandy 1992). This type of informa-
tion has a huge variety of properties: shapes, dynamics and
ﬂuxes. It displays relationships between components of the
machine, and between the machine and the environment. It
expresses a situation. It has characteristics which are
somewhat similar to those of a ﬁeld but also of a graph.
Typically, what we name epigenetics carries over chassis-
typeinformation.Agreatmanyworksdealingwiththestudy
of the brain (Edelman 1987), or of cognition (Clark 1998;
Ryle1949)hastakenintoaccountthistypeofinformation.It
isalsoattherootofmuchworkonartiﬁciallife,learningand
memory where reproduction, rather than replication is the
explicit goal (see e.g. Bullock et al. 2008). But there is not
yet, despite many advances, explicit consistent theories of
the corresponding information (Tanaka 1984).
That we might code this information after digitisation
does not place it automatically within the realm of under-
standable or valuable sequence information, as the very
process of digitisation is only efﬁcient knowing which type
of Turing Machine would read out the corresponding
sequence. This can be shown as follows. Algorithmic com-
plexity was meant to deﬁne what chance is, because chance
is the reference that permits deﬁnition of physical informa-
tion: a random sequence displays the highest complexity
(Cover and Thomas 1991; Zurek 1989). However this deﬁ-
nition does not hold, as it is context-dependent (Grandy
1992). Here is an open conjecture (a preliminary version has
been proposed in a different context by Wolfram (1985) and
it is interesting to follow the analysis of π by Simon Plouffe:
http://www.lacim.uqam.ca/~plouffe/). Take once again a
transcendentnumberlikeπ.Itsdigitsarepseudo-random:for
any sequence, there is a place in its digital development
where one can ﬁnd the sequence, whatever it is (this con-
jecture holds for inﬁnite many real numbers and we would
need to have a short algorithm to chose the one where the
position of the sequence can be readily identiﬁed). Now, the
digits can be generated by an algorithm of length N. Let us
chooseaputativealgorithmicallyrandomsequenceoflength
N plus an appropriate constant. The sequence can be gen-
erated by an algorithm shorter than the sequence, giving the
algorithm generating the number and the position of the
supposedly random sequence. Hence the sequence is not
random (QED). Note that the value of the information
(logical depth) is not ﬁxed. It depends on the algorithm, as it
differs in π and in any other transcendent algorithmically
generated real number. Said otherwise, the complexity and
depth of the sequence depends on the algorithm i.e. on the
context. Provided that we can prove the conjecture, this ﬁts
exactly the objection raised against the cell-as-a-computer
model: beside information in the program, there must be
information in the machine (providing the context). Hence,
the information of the machine is not described by our
present theory of information.
In the deﬁnition of logical depth, we have implicitly used
a property of algorithms, recursivity. In 1931 Go ¨del con-
structed a recursive algorithm, which, when decoded,
translated into a particular proposition, which, brieﬂy, sta-
ted:“Iam impossibletoprove”.Movingformonecontextto
another one, recursivity created a novel information, the
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ware. The genetic code, which enables nucleic acids to be
translated into proteins, which in turn manipulate nucleic
acids, behaves exactly as Go ¨del’s procedure does (Danchin
2003, 2009a). The consequence of this demonstration is that
apurelydeterministicsystem,withknowninitialconditions,
may have an entirely unpredictable outcome. By contrast
with the mechanistic philosophy, even with its more modern
appendices such as feedback and feedforward loops, recur-
sivity brings about novelty not because we fail to grasp all
initial conditions of a particular phenomenon, but because it
can be only understood a posteriori, after it has unfolded in
space an time. This implies that synthetic biology, when it
takes recursivity into account, develops in a world that is
totally irreducible to the world of systems biology, which
remains an elaborate episode of the study of mechanistic
automata. An important consequence is that what we com-
monly term the “genetic program” because it unfolds
throughtimeinaconsistentmannerisnotaprogrammewith
an aim (we would not be able to predict any aim) - it is
merely there, and functions because it cannot do otherwise.
We only perceive a design because the end result is familiar
to us, and thus seems more “right” than any other possible
result (Danchin 2009a).
Ifcreation ofinformationdepends heavily onthe context,
we must identify in living organismsfunctionswhich permit
it to accumulate, and relate it to the material world. How are
particular structures or processes recruited to this aim? A
reﬂection on the coupling between accumulation of infor-
mation and energy based on work developed by Landauer
and Bennett, showed that the relationship between energy
and information is that there exists degradative processes
which “make room” using energy to prevent degradation of
what is functional ((Bennett 1988a; Landauer 1961),
detailed analysis in (Danchin 2009a, d), see also a very
recent development (Sagawa and Ueda 2009)). In such a
situationitisthecontextthatdetermineswhichgeneproduct
isfunctionalandwhichisnot.Theconsequenceisthat,ifthe
context does not vary too rapidly, then the functions which
will be selectively retained are sculpting an image of the
environmentwithin,creatingadaptation.Thisisexactlyhow
an information can get a meaning. In terms of synthetic
biology, this orients research towards learning and memory,
rather than towards ﬁxed mechanical engineering.
In guise of conclusion: the brain is not a computer,
yet it manipulates information
Trying to put vitalism to an end, Claude Bernard placed
biology within the realm of physics and chemistry (Bernard
1865). This led his followers to ask the question: what are
the relevant entities (material objects and processes) which
make a cell alive? The biochemical inventory stage started
well, with the discovery of the ribosomes, of the structure
of the DNA double helix, of the sequence of the poly-
peptide chain of insulin, and, rapidly of messenger RNA
(Judson 1979). Yet, many features of biological entities
resisted the classical analysis of chemistry and physics.
This was apparent in the laws of genetics, where linear
arrangements of the elusive genes was central (Gayon
2007). Even in biochemistry the shape of molecules posed
an enigma: La dissyme ´trie, c’est la vie, insisted Pasteur.
But the involvement of shape was deeper than usual: the
very process of replication placed the concept of form in a
world quite different from the simple arrangement of a
particular setup in 3D as shape would suggest. Replication
shifted the idea of a chemical as the substrate of a recog-
nition process to that, abstract, of a template, in this case
for a duplication process doubling the number of the initial
molecule. Subsequently, the discovery of transcription,
translation, and associated control and coding processes,
continued to shift emphasis from shape to form in an
abstract way, commonplace in mathematics.
Information—creating and manipulating form—was
essential to account for life processes. From the world of
Plato’s archetypes, those who explored the basic concepts
of life resorted to discussions which began with Aristotle
and placed form as a central category of reality. For some
time, and this is still quite visible in systems biology as
well as in synthetic biology, living organisms were seen as
mechanistic automata, with feedback and feedforward
loops as paradigmatic entities. The purpose of the present
reﬂection was to try and show that investigating the con-
cept of information shifts eighteenth century’s automata to
modern algorithmic machines, capable of authentic crea-
tion. This implied replacing feedback by recursivity, a
much deeper process. Recursivity, associated to appropri-
ate management of energy (Bennett 1988a; Landauer 1961;
Sagawa and Ueda 2009), creates information (Danchin
2009a). It does so by identifying two domains where
information must be taken into account: information of a
program and information of a machine. However, while the
information of the program is fairly deeply explored by a
vast community of investigators, this is not so of the
information of the machine/chassis, which involves some
kind of measurement of the context (in terms of imple-
mentation within the four categories, matter, energy, space
and time) (Tanaka 1984; Sagawa and Ueda 2009).
It is perhaps in the functioning of the brain that we can
make the latter type of information most prominent.
Indeed, while von Neumann and others invented computers
with mimicking the brain in mind (von Neumann 1958),
the brain does not appear to behave as a Turing Machine
(Edelman 1987). There is no “gost in the machine” (Ryle
1949). However, nobody would doubt that brain manages
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Bullock et al. 2008). To my view this is a strong indication
that the information we describe when considering mes-
sages is a tiny part of what information is. Because we use
language, built on the exchange of sequences of symbols,
exactly as programs are exchanged in computers, linguists
often saw the brain as a Turing Machine. But language is
deeply associated to meaning: I had in 1974 at a meeting of
the Centre Royaumont pour une Science de l’Homme at the
MIT, a heated argument with Noam Chomsky about other
features of human languages, such as rhythm (in the west
african language mo ¨re ´, a speaker may begin a rythmic
sentence, which is answered preserving rythmic rules by
somebody in the audience, triggering another ejaculation of
the speaker, with related rules, etc) suggesting that beside
grammatical syntactic structures, there may exist a variety
of superimposed contexts which transmit information
mediated by channels that are not those usually considered
(Danchin 1987, Danchin and Marshall 1987; Marshall et al.
1987). As in Dyson’s scenario of the origin of life, the
basic functioning of the brain would base on reproduction,
while invention of language with its linear sequences of
phonemes, when spoken, and letters when written, would
be, in Man, the transition moment when it would begin to
discover recursivity in linear strings of symbols (pho-
nemes) which can be propagated from brain to brain, as
programs in a Turing Machine. In any event, in the few
cases where it might do so, it would be an extremely slow
one (Sackur and Dehaene 2009). With this view, Nature
would have discovered twice the importance of coding and
recursivity, in the emergence of life ﬁrst, and in the
emergence of language, quite recently.
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